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LEGAL PROVISIONS PURSUANT TO RUCA 24(a)(6) & (f) 
URCP 55 (e) states in pertinent part: 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissable in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith ... Emphasis Added. 
URCP 11 states in pertinent part: 
...The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by 
him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well founded in fact 
and warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as 
to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation ... If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose on the person 
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. Emphasis Added. 
Rule 806. Attacking and supporting credibility 
of declarant. 
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined 
in Rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D), or (E), has been admitted 
in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be 
attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any 
evidence which would be admissible for those pur-
poses if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence 
of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any 
time, inconsistent with his hearsay statement, is not 
subject to any requirement that he may have been 
afforded, an opportunity to deny or explain. If the 
party against whom a hearsay statement has been 
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is 
entitled to examine him on the statement as if \mrlpr 
cross-examination. 
<c 
ARTICLE VIII. 
HEARSAY. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or 
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a 
person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who 
makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The de-
clarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement and the statement is (A) inconsis-
tent with his testimony or the witness denies 
.having made the statement or has forgotten, 
or (B) consistent with his testimony and is 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against him of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive, or (C) one of identifica-
tion of a person made after perceiving him; 
or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The 
statement is offered against a party and is 
(A) his own'statement, in either his individ-
ual or a representative capacity, or (B) a 
statement of which he has manifested his 
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a state-
ment by a person authorized by him to make 
a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a 
statement by his agent or servant concern-
ing a matter within the scope of his agency 
or employment, made during the existence of 
the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-
conspirator of a party during the course and 
in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by 
law or by these rules. 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of de-
clarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
even though the declarant is available as a .witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement 
describing or explaining an event or condition 
made while the declarant was perceiving the 
event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating 
to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activ-
ity. A memorandum, report, record, or data com-
pilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time 
by, or from information transmitted by, a person 
with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regu-
larly conducted business activity, and if it was 
the regular practice of that business activity to 
make the memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the 
source of information or the method or circum-
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustwor-
thiness. The term "business" as used in this para-
graph includes business, institution, association, 
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, 
whether or not conducted for profit. ' *' 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Paragraph 
(6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the 
memoranda, reports, records, or data compila-
tions, in any form, kept in accordance with the 
provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoc-
currence or nonexistence of the matter, if the 
matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation was regularly 
made and preserved, unless the sources of infor-
mation or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
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APPELLEES1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Buyers correspondence to Sellers dated 4 June 1991 demanded 
"payment for the repairs" (R - 74, para 4) regarding a "flame 
disturbance" stated in the 20 April 1991 Mountain Fuel Notice. R - 58. 
This Notice expressly suggested "proper repair, corrections and a 
complete inspection" not installation of a new furnace, and 
definitely did not record the presence of a crack (lately denominated 
a "hole" in Appellees' Brief, p 16) or toxic gas on 20 April 1991. 
Sellers, nonetheless, served an Offer of Judgment (R - 17) to cure 
the alleged deficiency. Buyers refused to permit repair of the 
condition Buyers said was observed by others on 12 September 1991, 
about five months after the closing of the sale. R - 47, # 19. Buyers 
seek to negate their refusal to allow the Sellers' attempt to repair 
by proffering inadmissible hearsay purportedly said about 26 April 
1991, before Buyers ever contacted the Sellers, alleging that the 
furnace was irreparable (R - 45, # 8), however Buyers adopted a 
statement of a Mountain Fuel representative that tends to prove that a 
repair was possible and proffered it to the lower court at the 
hearing. Trans 2, L 9. This statement was supposed to have been 
uttered when the purported defect was alleged first to have been 
observed on 20 April 1991. Buyers never swore they personally observed 
a crack or "hole", and nor could their attorney. R - 43-48. 
Consistent with Buyers' refusal of repair, they precluded 
replacement of the furnace with another used furnace, additionally 
swearing in Buyers' Affidavit more inadmissible hearsay of another 
un-named declarant that "used furnaces were very unpredictable" (R -
47, # 18), thus rebutting the contention (Buyers' Brief, p 5) that 
they would have permitted replacement with a used furnace. Contrary to 
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Buyers' assertion, they had other alternatives than demanding the 
value of a new furnace and filing suit? for example, negotiating 
directly with Sellers. R -66, 17-19. 
Sellers inadvertently incorporated the course of procedure in the 
lower court in their Brief after inaccurately noting the date on 
Buyer's Affidavit, 12 November 1991 (R - 48) and assuming the motion 
for summary judgment it supported was also filed then rather than on 
11 December 1991. R - 26. 12 November 1993 was about ten days after 
Sellers sent Buyers a third Offer of Judgment in answer to Buyers' 
complaint. R - 19. The rejection of this third Offer was announced by 
receipt of Buyers' motion for summary judgment. As appears from the 
record below, Sellers had refrained from the expense of formal 
discovery while attempting to settle the matter fairly and 
economically through negotiations concerning the Buyers' demand for 
the value of a new furnace. 
Sellers responded to the Buyers' motion by objecting that summary 
judgment would abrogate a fair opportunity to cross-examine the 
witnesses whose hearsay was stated in Buyers' affidavit against 
Sellers. Discovery would have permitted Sellers to refute the hearsay 
attributed by Buyer/affiants to these un-named declarants, even if 
cross-examination at trial was abated. R - 61, # 3 - 5 . Hence, 
although Buyers are correct that their motion was not filed ten days 
after the Answer, the rejection of Sellers' third Offer of Judgment by 
service of Buyers' motion did have the same preclusionary effect on 
discovery as would filing the motion ten days after the 28 August 1991 
Answer to the complaint served on 13 August 1991. 
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Nature of the Case 
Contrary to facts in Buyers* Brief, Buyers failed to comply with 
the requirements of Cabrera v Cottrell, 694 P2d 622, 624 (Ut 1985) 
fettering judicial economy and needlessly increasing the attorney fees 
they sought at the hearing of their motion for summary judgment. 
Buyers withheld the itemized evidence which prevented the lower court 
from complying with Cabrera by finding facts and stating conclusions 
of law in its judgment as to the fairness and reasonability of the 
attorney fees sought. Sellers objected to Buyers* deficient affidavit 
(R - 23 & 24). R - 61, # 7; 65, # 21-23; & 96; Trans 29 - 30. 
Instead of finding attorney fees were waived in accord with 
Cabrera v Cottrell,supra, p 624 for failure to adduce evidence in 
support of reasonable attorney fees at the motion hearing, the lower 
court permitted a second, separate opportunity after the initial 
hearing of the motion for summary judgment for Buyers to submit the 
omitted evidence of attorney fees. R - 23-24 vis-a-vis R 107-114. The 
lower court initially stated the amount of attorney fees seemed high 
in consideration of the amount in dispute before erroneously extending 
the Buyers the second opportunity to subsequently submit the omitted 
evidence after the hearing instead of finding the fees waived 
consistent with case law. Trans, p 30. Dixie State Bank v Bracken, 
764 P2d 985, 990 (Ut 1988), nte 8, as cited by Buyers, actually 
augments the holding of Cabrera that an affidavit in the first 
instance must state with particularity evidence entitling a party to 
the amount of attorney fees sought or those fees are waived. 
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Appellees1 Statement of Facts 
1. There is no evidence introduced on the record below that the 
contract Buyers' chose to use in this case was approved by the 
Attorney General or a Commission. Furthermore, decisons of the Office 
of the Attorney General are not precedental; for example, it 
previously allowed a state agency to summarily strip two dentists of 
their licenses without a due process and substantial damages were paid 
for denial of such commonly understood constitutional rights. 
Insertion of irrelevant facts about the commission and Attorney 
General vis-a-vis the form of Agreement chosen by Buyers are 
immaterial on appeal and do not assauge the rule that the contract 
terms are to be construed against the Buyers as draftors. 
3. Buyers admit that the heating system need only work 
satisfactorily at closing and no later. General Provision C. 
4. Buyers admit "except for express warranties," all other 
provisions contained in the Agreement are contracually abrogated after 
execution and delivery of closing documents. General Provision 0. 
Therefore, only General Provision C may survive the closing and 
General Provision N, that addresses default or refusal to close the 
sale and entitlement to attorney fees for failure to effectuate the 
closing, likewise is entirely abrogated by the express operation of 
General Provision 0 that contractually nullifies Buyers' demand for 
attorney fees on appeal as well as in the lower court according to the 
contract the lower court had before it and was duty bound to construe 
in its entirety and to give effect to its terms as completely as 
practicable, as discussed hereinafter. 
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7. Buyers could have continued use of the furnace upon 
immediate possession after the closing if they had the gas service 
continued in their name. Since they neglected to do so, Sellers had 
the gas turned-off on the day of closing and the gas, according to the 
record below, was turned-on at Buyers* option five days later. The 
furnace purportedly was operated on a Saturday, 20 April 1991 after 
5:00 P.M. and then shut-off after operation for a flame disturbance. R 
58. The Notice contradicts Buyers' assertion that the gas pipes were 
disconnected or had to be connected or hooked-up before the gas was 
turned-on, furnace lighted, operated and the flame observed. R - 58. 
8. The Notice directly rebuts Buyers* assertion that a Mountain 
Fuel employee refused to light the furnace or that any gas line was 
cut (Trans 25, L 15), since logically the gas already must have been 
connected for the furnace flame pattern to be noted. Trans 22 -24, 15. 
No Mountain Fuel employee would swear an affidavit authenticating the 
Notice was completed in the normal course of business or when, and if, 
the "large crack" or "hole" existed apart from the Notice. R-110-111. 
9. Buyers frustrated Sellers* attempt to contact Buyers* 
agent/inspector and obstructed negotiations. R - 67, 68, 69 para 3. 
Buyers* inspector admitted he observed no defect in the furnace prior 
to the closing and that he had been induced to return the inspection 
fee to Buyers. R - 66, 64 # 9 & 17. This admission, a URE 801(d)(2) 
hearsay exclusion) by Buyers' inspector/agent about the refund, was 
substantiated by Buyers' counsel and never denied. R -83; 64, # 9 & 17 
11. No admissable evidence from any person purported to have been 
present on 12 September 1991, five months after the closing, swears to 
Buyers' hearsay contention that others observed a large crack. 
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12. Likewise, Buyers' self-serving, inadmissable hearsay about 
irrepairability is unsubstantiated by an affidavit of a Mountain Fuel 
employee and is contradicted by Buyers. Trans 2, L 9. Also, p 1 supra. 
13. Contrary to Buyers' erroneous assertion, Sellers most 
certainly did directly contradict that the furnace was in 
unsatisfactory working condition on the day of closing through 
personal knowledge of Seller/affiant. R -64, para 10, 11, 17 & 9. 
While Buyers erroneously complain Sellers failed to present a 
countering legal position to the motion for summary judgment, they 
inconsistently carp that documents Sellers filed to counter the motion 
"contained numerous conclusions of law." R - 60-79 & R - 93-96. 
15. Buyers mis-state that "Sellers admitted during oral argument 
that there were no facts before the court to refute Buyers' evidence" 
and "Sellers submitted no evidence to dispute the defective condition 
of the furnace," that is the hearsay crack purported by Buyers. 
Sellers, within the limited scope of the question posed by the lower 
court about whether "according to Plaintiff" others saw a crack on 12 
September 1991, five months after the closing, confirmed that was what 
Buyers held and at no time did Sellers concede as accurate Buyers' 
speculation about what these others may have seen and concluded, nor 
could Sellers' counsel ethically offer his testimony. Trans 8-10. 
More reliably Buyers' contention about the condition of the furnace on 
12 September 1991 was specifically rebutted on oral argument from 
direct personal knowledge of the satisfactory condition of the furnace 
on the day of closing, 15 April 1991, in Sellers' affidavit and by 
inference from Buyers' inspector's admission. Trans 12-13, R - 64, 
para 9, 10, 11, 17. 
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16. On summary judgment in this case where the right to have a 
jury as fact finder was demanded, the judge is proscribed by law from 
drawing inferences of facts against the non-moving party to the effect 
that because a condition existed five days after the closing that 
condition must have existed at or before the closing of the sale; 
especially when directly rebutted by averments R - 64, para 9, 10, 11, 
17. Such factual determinations are committed by law to the 
prerogative of the jury contrary to Buyers' erroneous assertions. 
17-18. No re-litigation of the unreasonability of Buyers' 
attorneys fees exists. Buyers'affidavit (R - 23) was found inadequate 
to adduce an award of attorney fees during the motion for summary 
judgment (Trans 29-30). Attorney fees should have been found waived 
for disobeying the itemization requirements and principles of judicial 
economy held as a failure of proofs in Cabrera and Dixie State Bank. 
While the lower court erroneously found Buyers entitled to attorney 
fees, it initially refused to decide on the reasonability of the 
amount sought and erroneously delayed the issue since Buyers withheld 
adequate proof at the hearing contrary to precedent. On the record the 
lower Court refused to hear Sellers' argument that the amount of fees 
caused by Buyers' recalcitrant tactics were unreasonable and 
unmitigated, although such argument is relevant and material to the 
determination of attorney fees as held in Dixie State Bank, supra, p 
991. Trans 18-19. Since the lower court offered Sellers might object 
again later, doing so after receipt of the itemization that should 
have been submitted as required by law at the earlier hearing could 
not be re-litigation and Sellers' counsel should not be sanctioned for 
opposing the unreasonability of specific itemizations seen for the 
first time only after the hearing. Trans 29-30. 
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ARGUMENT I 
INADMISSABILTY OF BUYERS' AFFIDAVIT 
A 
Buyers attempt to bootstrap into admissability, by use of a Notice 
to repair, self-serving hearsay purportedly stated by a Mountain Fuel 
employee who refused (R - 111) to aver by affidavit those statements. 
R - 58. R - 110-111 was withheld from the lower court by Buyers during 
the hearing of the motion for summary judgment and demand for attorney 
fees, contrary to the requirements of Cabrera and Dixie State Bank, 
although entries of 10/23 - 10/30 are probative of Sellers' position 
that Mountain Fuel would not aver hearsay in Buyers' affidavit, so 
Buyers merely proffered their own inadmissable hearsay in their 
affidavit to accomplish their objective, a new furnace rather than a 
repair or comparable replacement. Trans 2, L 9. 
The Notice on face is unsigned by the creator, the Order Number 
expected to appear in the usual course of a business using such a form 
is absent and the Notice expressly suggests repair, not a new furnace, 
contrary to Buyers' extrinsic hearsay about unrepairability. Such 
inconsistencies render questionable the authenticity of Notice 
pursuant to URE 806 (6). The absence of any notation about the 
presence of a "large crack" or "toxic gas" on 20 April 1991, urged on 
the court through Buyers' extrinsic hearsay, is actually probative of 
the non-existence of those conditions since such grave concerns are 
not included in the Notice where one would expect them to be 
recorded. URE 803 (7). 
G.M. Dev v Community American, 795 P2d 827 (Ariz App 1990) is 
cold comfort for Buyers since the holding regarding the admissability 
of hearsay statements as evidence in a G.M. president's affidavit was 
founded upon facts demonstrating that this president was an employee 
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of a business who was familar with, and could authenticate, the 
records normally kept in the course of the business over which he 
presided and his averments were directly derived from records that he 
could verify were authentic and normally kept in the course of the 
business over which he presided. The Buyers* instantly did not sustain 
the burden to produce an affidavit from any employee familar with the 
operation of Mountain Fuel who could mimic the authenticating function 
served by the president in the G. M. Development case. Furthermore, 
the hearsay extrinsic to the Notice, regarding a crack, toxic gas, 
impossibility of repair and necessity of a new furnace vis-a-vis the 
express content of that Notice, indicates a lack of trustworthiness, 
especially where the business that purportedly generated the content 
of the Notice refused to provide Buyers an affidavit to authenticate 
the hearsay document, unlike the facts in G. M. Development. R -
110-111, entries 10/23-10/30. 
This Notice and other unsubstantiated, extrinsic hearsay that 
Buyers ascribed to Mountain Fuel on 20 April 1991, when Buyers finally 
had the gas service placed in their name and turned-on, clearly does 
not rebut Sellers' affidavit swearing that the furnace was in 
satisfactory working condition when it was turned-off on 15 April 
1991, the date of closing when Buyers took exclusive possession of the 
residence and the risk of loss contractually passed to them through 
General Provision P of the Agreement. If water pipes froze and burst 
as a result of Buyers neglecting to heat the premises for the five 
day period after closing, Sellers would not be responsible for that 
loss any more than they would be for a furnace defect that purportedly 
arose five days after they took possession of the premises, according 
to hearsay Buyers/affiants offer, not their own personal observation. 
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Hearsay of another unsworn declarant who refuses to provide an 
affidavit is not competent evidence for inclusion in Buyers' affidavit 
pursuant to URE 801 and URCP 56(e). R - 110-111, entries 10/23-10/30. 
Buyers affidavit fails to controvert Sellers averment that the 
furnace was in satisfactory working condition at closing (R -64, # 
9, 10, 11 & 17). Summary judgment should have been granted in favor of 
Sellers, since precedent constrains the lower court from drawing 
inferences against non-moving Sellers from statements allegedly heard 
by Buyers about the purported condition of the furnace five days after 
the closing. Buyers, moving parties, produced no sworn evidence 
contradicting that the furnace was not working satisfactorily at 
closing or before and the agent Buyers hired to exercise their right 
of inspection admitted finding the furnace satisfactory before 
closing. G.M. Development, supra, p 831-832. 
II 
CONTRACTUAL AMBIGUITY 
Big Cottonwood Tanner v S.L.C., 740 p2d 1357, 1358-1359 (Utah 
App 1987) holds not only that the Court of Appeals may deduce its own 
contractual interpretation and not defer to the lower court as a 
question of law, but also that all parts of the agreement should be 
given effect if it is reasonably practicable to do so to achieve the 
purpose of the earnest money agreement upon review of the entirety of 
agreement. Jones v Tinkle, 611 P2d 733, 735 (Ut 1980). The purpose 
of the subject Agreement is to cause the parties to close the sale and 
once that is concluded the entirety of the Agreement, including but 
not limited to General Provision N for attorney fees, is abrogated and 
unenforceable according to General Provision O. R - 52. 
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Earnest Money Sales Agreement, General Provision C, as confined by 
its terms, warrants specific systems to be in satisfactory condition 
at closing, when the risk of loss passes to Buyer (General Provision 
Pr R-52). It does not extend the warranty to conditions arising beyond 
that date and this limitation comports with General Provision 0 which 
abrogates the entirety of the Agreement upon execution and delivery of 
final closing documents,, "closing," excluding warranties that 
expressly continue and are preserved, unless excepted elsewhere in the 
contract; for example, by clause 1(e). Accordingly, when the closing 
triggers General Provision 0, General Provision N is abrogated in its 
entirety including the attorney fees terms that are available if a 
party defaults by failing to close. 
General Provision C contains no terms entitling a party to 
attorney fees for enforcement of warranties on appeal or otherwise. 
After the purpose of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and General 
Provision N , the close of the sale, was consumated, the Buyers were 
contractually precluded from attorney fees on appeal or otherwise, 
since the lower court is required by law to review the entirety of the 
contract before ruling on summary judgment and General Provision N in 
its entirety, including the terms regarding attorney fees, is entirely 
abrogated by General Provision 0, along with all other provisions that 
are not expressly preserved. 
Buyers misplace their reliance on Brooks v Hodges, 606 P2d 77, 
78-79 (Col App 1979) wherein the parties were extended their full 
panoply of due process rights at trial. The Brooks buyers went to the * 
residence on the day of closing and personally experienced and 
observed the change of condition between the date the agreement was 
signed and the closing. Buyers and their professional rug cleaner 
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testified about the presence of animal odor and hardened excrement in 
the rugs and their repair attempts. This was sufficient reliable 
evidence for the trier of fact to conclude at trial that conditions 
had changed before closing, not after. 
The factual bases for the Colorado court's holding in Brooks are 
inapposite to those instantly. First, the Brooks parties enjoyed a 
trial where fact finding was appropriate. Instantly a motion for 
summary judgment was heard where fact determinations were to be 
precluded and any inferences of fact decided in favor of the 
non-moving party, Sellers. The lower court erroneously found facts and 
drew inferences favoring the moving party, Buyers, about when the 
purported breach of condition occured. Second, in Brooks direct 
testimonial evidence of persons who personally experienced and 
actually observed the non-conformity was received subject to 
cross-examination that demonstrated the proofs were credible and 
reliable. Instantly Buyers offer unreliable hearsay of an unidentified 
declarant whose Mountain Fuel attorney declined an affidavit 
corroborating the statements Buyers proffer declarant stated. Buyers 
never swore that they personally observed or experienced any flame 
disturbance, crack, split, "hole," or toxic fumes at any time after 
the closing. Third, there was not a lapse of five days before buyers 
chose to go to the residence in Brooks and this reasonably assured 
the trier of fact could find as certain the non-conformity occurred 
before the closing, not after. Brooks, supra, p 78. Fourth, Buyers 
in Brooks were not parties to an agreement that contained an 
abrogation clause like General Provision 0 that must be construed 
against Buyers, draftors, as abolishing the agreement upon closing. 
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Buyers never swore why they did not expeditiously continue the gas 
service in their own name during a cold April 1991 or why they waited 
until the Saturday night after the Monday closing to have the gas 
turned-on. 
Sellers' Affidavit unequivocably avers the furnace was working 
satisfactorily on the day of closing when the gas was turned-off. If 
the alleged flame disturbance did exist five days after the closing, 
it certainly resulted after the closing and no inference to the 
contrary is permissable on summary judgment. Paragraphs 9f 11P and 17 
aver facts that are probative of and tend to substantiate the 
soundness of the furnace at closing. Still Buyers claim Sellers 
provided no evidence to contradict the Buyers' hearsay, while 
submitting no evidence that reliably proves a flame disturbance 
developed before the closing. Hearsay about what another alleges to 
have observed five days after closing does not provide reliable 
evidence to posit development of the condition prior to closing. 
Buyers' business record, (R - 15 or 58), purporting to reference 
the condition of the furnace after the gas was turned-on and the 
furnace was operating five days after the closing notes only a "flame 
disturbance." Buyer's embellished the Notice with self-serving, but 
inadmissible, hearasay statements at the hearing and in their 
affidavit, which clearly is absent verification of personal knowledge, 
observation or competence to testify as to whether the purported crack 
was present before closing. 
There was no admissable or credible evidence offered by Buyers' 
affidavit below that proved the furnace irreparable, the gas was 
"disconnected," the gas needed to be "hooked-up" or that a "hole" ever 
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existed. There was, however, proof in the record below that Buyers' 
had refused to permit Seller's a repair attempt and then offered 
hearsay as the reason for that refusal. If Buyers could establish a 
prima facie case, it is directly rebutted by Sellers' affidavit. 
Sellers should be granted summary judgment, according to Jones, 
supra, p 736 and G. M. Devel, supra, p 832 or remand for trial. 
Ill 
DAMAGES, FEES, AND OTHER ERRONEOUS MONETARY AWARDS 
A 
Buyers cite to irrelevant precedent concerning breach of a 
contract for services rendered and materials to construct a project 
that is factually inapposite to the instant case about the purchase of 
a residence and hornbook law teaches the plaintiff should prove the 
difference in the price paid for the residence with a used furnace 
less proof of the value of that same residence with a purportedly 
infirm furnace. Keller v Deseret Mortuary, 455 P2d 197, 198 (Ut 
1969). The bargain instantly was for a purchase of a residence, not a 
furnace, nor for construction of a project. The correct measure of 
damage, if a breach is proven, compensates fairly for the loss of 
value in the residence and is the most "practical and accurate" method 
of ascertaining damages. Even Odds v Nielson, 448 P2d 709, 711 (Ut 
1968). 
Sellers submitted proof that the furnace was in an older home and 
it follows from rational inference in Sellers' favor that the furnace 
was older, used not new. R - 64 & 65, # 11, 12, 15, 20. Buyers posit 
the convoluted argument that Sellers failed to meet the burden of 
proof of damages as an artifice to misdirect scrutiny away from 
Buyers' failure to sustain the burden of adducing proper or sufficient 
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evidence to ascertain the amount of the damages with adequate 
certainty. Buyers' inability or unwillingness to adduce such proof 
does not per se shift the burden to Seller as Buyers erroneously state 
in their Brief, page 26 without supporting precedent. In effect Buyers 
argue since they did not adduce proper proofs because it is too 
arduous for them, the court should merely defer to their demand for a 
new furnace. Buyers on motion for summary judgment should not expect 
lower court, frustrated by Buyer's lack of accurate proof, to succumb 
to Buyers' demand for the full value of a new warranteed furnace. 
The fairer and more accurate measure of damage reasonably is the 
diminution of the value of the house purportedly caused by the 
deficient furnace. Upon Buyers' inability to prove loss of value in 
the residence by a bona fide expert like a residential appraiser or 
the loss of value in the existing used furnace absent the purported 
deficiency through an expert in furnace sales and repair, damages 
should have been denied for lack of sufficient proof, not awarded at 
the value of a new furnace. 
If Buyers were entitled to be awarded damages to fairly put them 
in as good a position as if the contract were performed, as they 
contend, they could have adduced as proof of monetary damages the 
value of a satisfactorily working used furnace of the same age and 
type as in the house purchased and assured to them by their inspector. 
As a third alternative, a proration computed upon proof of the 
price Buyers actually paid for the new furnace they allege installing 
might have sufficed had Buyers not withheld it. R-47, #24). 
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Buyers' gratuitous proffer of facts on appeal, not sworn to below, 
about buying the furnace on installments at inceased cost interjects 
more inadmissible hearsay unsupported by business records to 
prejudicially skew the case on appeal just as was unfairly done in the 
court below. URCP 56(e). 
Damages are money compensation for the proven value of a loss and even 
if Buyers desire a new furnace instead of permitting a repair or 
replacement, the proper amount of damages is not the value of a new 
furnace, THE BENEFIT OF BUYERS' BARGAIN IS THE VALUE OF A USED FURNACE, 
NOTHING MORE. 
For the lower court to award the value of the bid for a new 
furnace unfairly compensated Buyers far in excess of the value of full 
performance of the Agreement. Such damages are an unfair windfall 
whose value extends far beyond the expected useful life of the furnace 
for which Buyers bargained. Ascertainment of damages is a factual 
issue to be tried to the jury and not a matter of law reposed in the 
judge on a motion for summary judgment. 
What is most disturbing in Buyers' Brief, p 28-29, is the 
attempt to conceal from the courts and Sellers, by procedural 
machinations, Buyers' recovery of about $125.00 from Buyers' 
inspector/agent which forthrightly should have been applied by the 
lower court to mitigate Sellers' damages. URE 801(d)(2) allows 
admissions of an agent acting for a party-opponent like Buyers as 
evidence that Buyers extracted a refund of the inspection fee from 
their agent, especially when such admission is confirmed by the 
attorney agent of Buyers as a hearsay exclusion and the admission is 
set forth in the record below. R - 64, # 9 & 17; 66; 80; 83, para 2; 
84, para 4; 68.. 
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Buyers had the opportunity to deny the accuracy of the agent's 
admission about return of his fee to Buyers, but Buyers never denied 
same, nor do they in their Brief on appeal. They attempt, instead, to 
conceal the truth and avoid justice by erroneously stating nothing in 
the record supports Sellers' argument that Buyers did not mitigate. 
The admission of the agent is admissable as stated in Sellers' 
affidavit on knowledge and belief, since Buyers' agents did adopt 
these hearsay exclusions as true. R - 64; URE 801(1)(d). The burden is 
now on the Buyers/principals to deny them, but they can't and haven't 
so Buyers merely attempt procedural chicanery to avoid the truth. For 
this reason discovery and a fair trial should be extended on remand. 
B & C 
Awarding Attorney Fees Was Erroneous 
It is well settled in Utah that attorney fees may not be awarded 
absent an entitlement in a statute or contract. In Trayner v 
Cushing, 688 P2d 856, 858 (Ut 1984) the Utah Supreme Court taught 
that parties are only entitled to fees if provided within the 
agreement, which the Supreme Court tightly construed in Trayner to 
deny fees. Dixie State Bank, supra, p 991. 
As discussed earlier on appeal, review of a summary judgment is de 
novo in scope and instantly contractual General Provision N that 
permits recovery of attorney fees to enforce a default of the 
agreement to close the sale is absolutely abrogated after the closing 
by General Provision O of the controlling contract. Only warranties 
expressed to survive closing may do so. While General Provision C may 
transcend closing it plainly is devoid of any entitlement to attorney 
fees for warranty enforcement after the closing. 
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This limitation is as applicable on appeal as it is for services 
performed in the trial court. Rosenlof v Sullivan, 676 P2d 372, 376 
(Ut 1983). Buyers are contractually prohibited from seeking attorney 
fees once the closing is concluded. 
Cabrera, supra, p 624 and Dixie State Bank hold Buyers also 
waived any right they might putatively have to to claim attorney fees 
for failure to adduce adequate evidence to support reasonable attorney 
fees at the motion hearing and the judge found the affidavit 
inadequate, the fees high, and directed Buyers' counsel to 
subsequently submit a thorough itemization. Trans 29 & 30; R - 23. 
Sellers had accurately objected to the inadequacy of Buyers' 
affidavit, warning Buyers before the hearing but they did nothing to 
remediate the deficiency. Buyers' failure to conform to the 
evidentiary requirements established by the Supreme Court warrants the 
denial of attorney fees, especially where Buyers' omission needlessly 
increased the inconvenience and expense for the court and parties as 
well as offending judicial economy. R - 65, #22 & 23; 61, # 7; 62. 
Although Buyers waited thirty days after the alleged discovery of 
the breach and chose to incur the expense of an attorney rather than 
contacting the Sellers directly for an expeditious cure (R - 77-78), 
although Buyers increased expenses by filing suit in response to 
Sellers' letter stating that Buyers' inspector found the furnace in 
average condition prior to the closing (R - 66), although Buyers 
rejected half the price of a new furnace to replace the used furnace 
and other offers and continued to demand the full price of a new 
furnace contrary to law (R - 19), although Buyers refused to allow 
Sellers an attempt to repair the purported problem, although Buyers 
refused to acknowledge the reduction of the damages sought from 
Sellers by the amount extracted from Buyers' inspector/agent, Buyers 
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now attempt to project their exacerbation of fees and intransigence 
onto Sellers to avoid denial or reduction of attorney fees taught as 
proper under the instant circumstances by Dixie State Bank, supra, p 
991. Murty and Vermont Low Income, cited in Sellers' Brief, requires denial of fees. 
The "amount in controversy" has always been a determining factor 
in assessing reasonable attorney fees, although no set formula exists 
and the award is not measured by the amount billed and hours spent. 
Wallace v Build Inc, 402 P2d 699, 700 (Ut 1965), Cabrera, supra, p 
624. Factors in DR 2-106 or URPC 1.5(a), which duplicate those set 
forth in the Johnson case cited in Sellers' Brief, all include the 
amount in controversy as a substantial factor in assessing 
reasonability. Buyers' attorney fees are unreasonably four times the 
amount in controversy and the lower court initially looked askance at 
this disparity but later gave Buyers all the fees they demanded 
contrary to the abrogation of such entitlement by General Provision 0 
of the contract. R - 29 & 30. Attorney fees are precluded instantly. 
D 
No Bad Faith Re-litigation of Reasonability Exists 
Where the Buyers, contrary to the requirements of the Supreme Court as 
held in Cabrera and Dixie State Bank, failed to file itemized 
evidence of services rendered and fees with the motion for summary 
judgment and the issue of the unreasonability of those fees logically 
could not be addressed at that hearing and could only be opposed 
thereafter, fees are waived. Even the lower court found the fees 
appeared high in Buyers' superficial and wholly inadequate initial 
affidavit (R-23), but Buyers were granted the opportunity to submit 
the itemization later. Sellers should not be sanctioned for exercising 
the right to defend themselves against a demand for unfair attorney 
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fees in the same manner as permitted the litgants in Trayner, Dixie 
State Bankf and Cabrera, especially where the lower court gave Buyers 
a second bite of the apple after failure to submit sufficient evidence 
to establish the reasonability of the fees sought and the itemization 
initially withheld during the hearing of the motion for summary 
judgment proved exactly Sellers' point at the hearing for summary 
judgment - Buyers' affidavit relied exclusively on inadmissable 
hearsay because Mountain Fuel would not corroborate those hearsay 
statements Buyers' affidavit ascribed to a utility employee/declarant. 
Exposing this chicanery does not justify the sanctioning of 
Sellers' attorney and according to Cabrera, supra, p 624, such 
obfuscatory tactics by Buyer that hinder the motion hearing and 
wastefully require additional court time, filings and expense merit a 
finding of the waiver of attorney fees according Cabrera (PAGE 7,supra). 
IV 
DISCOVERY AND A TRIAL SHOULD BE PERMITTED ON REMAND SO 
THE TRUTH CAN BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT BY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND-
JUSTICE OBTAINED 
In those cases where it has been held issues not pursued at trial 
are waived, the parties had previously been extended the due process 
protections of a trial including the right to cross-examine the 
witnesses against them. Trayner, supra, p 857, Rosenlof, supra, p 
376. In Mascaro v Davis, 741 P2d 938, 944 (Ut 1987) the enforcement 
of a settlement agreement was at issue and it is unclear whether those 
parties enjoyed discovery or a trial to examine the issues the appeal 
court held should have been addressed below but which were in effect 
voluntarily waived through settlement. 
Instantly Sellers below always objected to not having the 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarants whose unsworn statements 
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Buyers purported as the truth in Buyers' affidavit. R - 61-62. Such 
cross-examination at trial or deposition of declarants, whose 
statements Buyers offered as evidence, is a rudimentary due process 
right that tests credibility of the statements and promotes 
ascertainment of the truth rather than permitting the interjection of 
unqualified, unreliable and self-serving hearsay by Buyers who would 
not use a subpoena and discovery to obtain the name of the purported 
declarant and his testimony under oath thus precluding Sellers' 
cross-examination. R - 71. Buyers merely submitted inadmissable 
hearsay in their affidavit that they say the declarant said because 
the declarant from Mountain Fuel would not provide an affidavit 
swearing to what Buyers submitted. R - 110-111. Extending due process 
fairness is not a "merry-go-round," especially where Buyers have 
demonstrated a willingness to conceal the truth, like their recovery 
of money from their furnace inspector toward mitigation of damages. 
Genuine issues of fact for the jury to decide exist below like 
whether the defect Buyers purport another found five days after the 
closing developed after the closing or before and what is the proper 
amount of damages, if any. It is Buyers' burden to persuade the jury 
by admissable evidence, not to avoid trial by unfair prejudicial 
hearsay contained in the affidavit which still does not swear whether 
the purported defect occurred before closing or after when Buyers 
allowed the residence to remain unheated for five days. 
When plaintiffs like Buyers do not carry their burden of proof by 
submission of sufficient admissable evidence their case should be 
dismissed. Providing unreliable hearsay does not carry the burden or 
shift it to defendants. 
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Buyers say Sellers waived the right to cross-examine Buyers' 
hearsay declarants on discovery, however, when Buyers did not carry 
their burden of proof below regarding attorney fees at the motion 
hearing contrary to the Supreme Court holding in Cabrera and 
recovery of such fees was thereby waived, the lower court merely 
extended the Buyers the opportunity to provide the proofs subsequent 
to the hearing and punished Sellers for objecting to the 
unreasonability of those fees and pointing out that such evidence 
which was required by law to be submitted at or before the motion 
hearing also would have proven Sellers contention at that hearing - that 
Buyers submitted an inadmissable hearsay in Buyers* affidavit because 
the declarant would not swear an affidavit corroborating the 
statements Buyers ascribed to him. Sellers demanded cross-examination 
below and did not waive discovery or the right to a jury trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The seminal facts in this case are in question and the court below was 
precluded from usurping the fact finding function of the jury by 
deciding that if a defect may have been present five days after the 
closing it must have been present before the closing. Facts in 
Sellers* affidavit directly contradict this deduction since only they 
swear to the satisfactory operation of the furnace on the day of 
closing. Remand for trial and discovery should be granted, mooting the 
issue that attorney fees were awarded contrary to the case law cited 
and the contractual provision abrogating attorney fees. 
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